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STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The statutory authority that confers jurisdiction on this 
court to decide this appeal is Utah Code Ann. §35-1-86, 
§63-46b-14(1) and §63-46b-16(1) 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The appeal presents the following issues, written in terms 
and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. 
Issue #1. Whether the ALJ and the Commission applied the 
correct standard of proof on the issue of medical causation. Did 
the ALJ and the Commission require that medical causation be proved 
not by a mere preponderance of the evidence but by certainty? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: 
This question is reviewable under an abuse of discretion 
standard, that is, whether the agency has abused the discretion 
delegated by statute to the agency, §63-46b-16 (4)(h)(i), whether 
the agency's action is contrary to agency past or current practice, 
§63-46b-16 (4) (h) (iii) and (ii), and whether the agency action is 
arbitrary and capricious, §63-46b-16(4)(h)(iv). 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that if the Legislature has by 
statute granted discretion to an agency to interpret and apply 
agency specific statutory law and the agency has developed a 
certain experience and expertise in doing so, an appellate court 
owes the agency's determinations a certain amount of deference. 
But the Industrial Commission's interpretation of the operative 
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provisions of the Workers Compensation Act must be within the 
limits of reasonableness and rationality. If the Industrial 
Commission has misconstrued or misapplied the statute or otherwise 
exceeded the bounds of reasonableness and rationality, the courts 
have a duty to correct the error. Utah Code Ann. §63 -46b-16 (4) (d) . 
See Tasters v. Department of Employment Security, 819 P.2d 361 
(Utah App. 1991), Robinson v. Department of Employment Security, 
827 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah App. 1992), Stokes v. Board of Review, 832 
P.2d 56, 58 (Utah App. 1992), Willardson v. Utah Industrial Comm., 
856 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah App. 1993) cert, granted, 870 P.2d 957 
(Utah 1994), Walls v. Industrial Commission, 857 P.2d 964,966 (Utah 
App. 1993) . 
Issue #2. Whether the ALJ and Commission committed error in 
determining that Mr. Thompson's evidence as to connections between 
the presence of chemicals in the workplace, together with Mr. 
Thompson's use of such chemicals in performing his work, and Mr. 
Thompson's seizures, did not satisfy the preponderance of the 
evidence standard. In other words, did the ALJ and the Commission 
commit error in holding that Mr. Thompson, in trying to prove the 
causal connection between the presence of and use by Mr. Thompson 
of chemical agents in the workplace and Mr. Thompson's seizures 
(or, in the alternative, between Mr. Thompson's pre-existing brain 
trauma, combined with his exposure to and use of chemicals in the 
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workplace, and his seizures) , did not satisfy the preponderance of 
the evidence standard? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: same as issue #1 
above. 
Issue #3 . Whether the ALJ and the Commission committed error 
in denying all benefits (even medical expenses) to Mr. Thompson. 
In other words, did the ALJ and the Commission commit error in 
determining that even though the medical panel found that the 
medical care afforded Mr. Thompson was reasonable and justified, 
Mr. Thompson should still not receive any workers benefits, even 
payment of medical expenses? 
Applicable standard of appellate review: same as issues #1 
and #2 above. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
Statutes, rules or cases believed to be determinative include: 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-45, §35-1-77 and §35-1-81. (Reproduced in 
Addendum) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE WITH PAGE REFERENCES TO THE RECORD ("R") 
This is an appeal from a final agency decision in a Workers 
Compensation case. The injured worker lost at the agency and 
hereby appeals to the Court on the ground the agency abused the 
discretion delegated to it by the Legislature 
The facts material to a consideration of the questions 
presented are as follows: 
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In 1993, Mr. Thompson was employed as an animal control 
off icer for Davis County. [Rl, R2, R65, R129] His work required 
him to use various chemical agents such as a Chlorox spray to clean 
and disinfect animal kennels and cages. [R65,66] Chlorox is a 
solution containing chlorine, a chemical with known toxic 
properties. [R166] 
On June 1, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced a grand mal seizure. 
[R66, R129, R162] He suffered this first seizure during work hours 
and while at work, immediately after using a Chlorox spray to clean 
and disinfect animal kennels. [R66, R131] 
On July 8, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced a second grand mal 
seizure. [R66, R129] He suffered this second seizure during work 
hours, soon after using a Chlorox spray to clean and disinfect 
animal kennels. [R66, R131] 
Mr. Thompson had a few instances of head trauma in his youth. 
He was involved in boxing in college which on one occasion resulted 
in a concussion. [R65] A few years later, he hit his head on the 
door of a truck. [R65] A year before the seizures he, in the 
course of his work for Davis County Animal Control, was charged by 
a bull, hit in the chest and knocked to the ground. [R65] He had 
never suffered a seizure before his first seizure on June 1, 1993. 
[R129-132] Subsequent to the second seizure he experienced on July 
8, 1993, he has not suffered any other seizures. 
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Davis County terminated Mr. Thompson's employment on August 
11, 1993. [R66] 
Mr. Thompson's physicians who treated him for the seizures, 
Dr. Dennis Peterson and then Dr. Roberta Hallquist, attributed both 
seizures to Mr. Thompson's previous brain trauma plus his exposure 
to the chemicals present in Mr. Thompson's workplace and used by 
Mr. Thompson in his particular work duties. [R68, R131, R137, 
R153, R154, R164, R180] 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah required Mr. Thompson to 
submit to an "independent medical examination". [R17] The 
physician who performed the IME, Dr. Matsuo, of the University of 
Utah's Neurology Department, did not visit the workplace or perform 
any tests regarding the use of chemicals by Mr. Thompson in the 
workplace and merely talked to Mr. Thompson and reviewed the 
medical records. The IME concluded his evaluation with cautious 
uncertainty: 
It is my understanding that the agent Chlorox (sodium 
hydrochlorite) is [an] irritant and overexposure would 
probably be obvious because of local mucosal irritation 
and possibly upper respiratory symptoms. It does not 
appear that Mr. Thompson has suffered either acute or 
chronic symptoms suggestive of such toxic exposure... I. 
am not sure if we have strong reasons to consider 
neurotoxicity of sodium hydroclorite (Chlorox) as 
explanation for the seizures. 
(Emphasis added.) [R68, R166-168] 
Due to the difference of medical opinion in this matter, the 
ALJ, following a hearing, appointed a medical panel to provide a 
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further opinion on the contested issue of medical causation. [R18-
This medical panel also only talked to Mr. Thompson and 
reviewed Mr. Thompson's medical records. [R37-46] The medical 
panel did not visit the workplace or perform any tests regarding 
the Mr. Thompson's exposure to or use of chemicals in the 
workplace. The medical panel did not survey the literature 
relating to the use of chlorine cleaning agents in the workplace, 
or otherwise examine the possible connections between the presence 
and use of chemicals in the workplace and their effect on humans, 
as Mr. Thompson had suggested they do. The medical panel concluded 
various factors contributed to the seizures but thought the 
previous remote instances of brain trauma were more likely the 
"culprit" than the exposure to chemicals in the workplace which 
immediately preceded the seizures: 
Our conclusion on this is based on an effort to 
balance various factors that may reasonably be considered 
as contributory to the occurrence of isolated grand mal 
seizures. On the one hand, we have the suggestion that 
one or more of the chemical substances he was exposed to 
triggered the seizures. It seems quite unlikely that the 
exposure to the Chlorox solution reached sufficient 
levels to cause any impact on his cerebral function since 
there does not appear to have been any of the observed 
prodromes of significant respiratory distress which 
ordinarily accompanied even slight exposures to any 
Chlorox type spray. There is secondly, a significant 
delay in the occurrence after the last exposure, during 
which he was apparently able to function well, suggesting 
there was no acute involvement. 
10 
On the other hand, we have a history of a number of 
other factors which must be considered. The decreased 
smell function is most commonly an effect of an injury 
which ruptures the olfactory fibers coming down through 
the lamina cribrosa beneath the frontal lobes. Although 
we do not know of a specific injury, this can occur 
without loss of consciousness or otherwise affect the 
person in other than loss of olfactory function, 
especially early in life. Secondly, there is a history 
of an abnormal ventricle consistent with an injury back 
in 1988. There is a localized EEG abnormality recorded, 
which is not likely the result of a diffuse general toxic 
agent. 
There are additional historic events to consider, 
including the "concussion" in the boxing match when he 
was in college, sufficient to require emergency room 
care, and according to his mother, a period when he 
missed enough school to delay his education. Secondly is 
the event when he hit his head on the door frame of the 
vehicle, which was considered sufficient to secure a CT 
scan at the time. Lastly, there is the slightly low 
blood sugar noted on arrival at the doctor's office, but 
this in itself would not have occurred from exposure to 
the chemicals under consideration. There is a long-
standing evidence of asymmetry of the lateral ventricles. 
Thus, it appears to the panel in terms of reasonable 
medical probability these other multiple evidences of 
impact on the brain were more likely the causative factor 
than what would have to be an extremely atypical manner 
of chemical effect on the brain. [R43-44] 
Significantly, the medical panel did not address the issue of 
the effect of historic brain trauma events and the immediate 
exposure to toxic agents in the workplace acting together or 
building upon one another. 
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The medical panel was giving us their best guess. But it 
remains a guess. 
The ALJ determined that "counsel for the applicant has done a 
commendable job in providing a thorough analysis as to why this 
case should be decided in favor of the applicant. However, medical 
causation is lacking, and the weight of medical opinion is contrary 
to a finding of medical causation." (Emphasis added.) [R69] 
By "weight", the ALJ apparently meant the medical panel report 
because the two treating physicians believed the exposure to the 
chemicals in the workplace was clearly the most likely causative 
agent and the IME was equivocal and uncertain. The ALJ placed much 
more faith in the medical panel's report than it warranted. 
Mr. Thompson filed a lengthy Motion for Review for review by 
the Industrial Commission. [R73-92] On December 2, 1994, the 
Industrial Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision in a brief 
opinion without elaboration or meaningful analysis. [R93-96] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Administrative Law Judge erred in three critical respects 
relating to burden of proof, and such errors require a reversal of 
the ALJ's Order. The Industrial Commission did not thoroughly 
analyze Mr. Thompson's arguments in his Motion for Review and by 
its decision denying his Motion for Review compounded the ALJ's 
errors. 
DETAIL OF THE ARGUMENT 
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Issue #1. The ALJ committed error in requiring certainty in 
medical causation. 
This is a difficult case, factually and legally. 
Factually, this case is difficult because the injury is by its 
very nature, quite mysterious. We are dealing with seizures, which 
are non-traumatic, totally brain-centered events. There were no 
eyewitnesses to the seizures other than the person who had the 
seizures, and that person was not conscious during the seizures and 
can't tell us a lot about what happened immediately prior to or 
during the seizures. It is no wonder that identifying the cause or 
causes of the injury is difficult. Everyone is guessing at what 
caused the seizures. Several factors, acting cumulatively or in 
combination, may have caused the seizures. The obvious way to test 
hypotheses as to causation, namely to replicate the conditions, 
might seriously injure or kill Mr. Thompson and is thus out of the 
question. 
Legally, this case is difficult because it raises serious 
questions about the whole concept of causation and the quantum of 
proof necessary to establish medical causation in cases involving 
non-traumatic, brain events such as seizures. 
A. The ALJ Decision and the Board Affirmance 
The Administrative Law Judge determined that the proof Mr. 
Thompson submitted was simply "insufficient" to establish a medical 
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connection between Mr. Thompson's work for Davis County Animal 
Control and his grand mal seizures. [R70] 
Mr. Thompson's Motion for Review argued the ALJ had required 
Mr. Thompson to prove causation in this unique kind of case to a 
high level of probability or even certainty, thereby applying a 
too-stringent standard of proof to Mr. Thompson's case. In its 
decision, the Commission ruled, without any analysis, that "the 
Commission's review of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ 
applied the correct standard of proof, preponderance of the 
evidence, to Mr. Thompson's claim." [R94] 
This is an incorrect conclusion. The ALJ erroneously assumed 
that the question of medical causation needed to be answered in 
absolute terms. This was an incorrect assumption and an abuse of 
discretion. The law is otherwise. Causation need not be absolute, 
but may be relative based on natural and reasonable inferences, if 
the basic facts in the record and common human experience will 
support such natural and reasonable inferences. 
B. Operative Statute, Regulation and Relevant Case Law 
Professor Larson, in his treatise, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, §41.32, 41.33(a), recognized this very problem of 
causation in non-traumatic brain dysfunction cases, and in his 
work, speaking in the context of occupational diseases, states: 
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If the employment is attended with unusual germs, 
poisons, chemicals, fumes, dusts, spores, or similar 
conditions, the problem of satisfying the distinction 
[between diseases that are neither accidental nor 
occupational, but common to mankind and not distinctively 
associated with employment, and occupational diseases] is 
not serious. Controverted . . . cases will usually be 
found to involve, not the definition, but a problem of 
proof: the question whether these employment conditions 
in fact produced the disability. 
Larson's solution is set forth in § 38.83(e): 
Although medical evidence in a particular case may be 
uncertain or deficient, this will not necessarily bar an award if 
it is the type of case in which the exertion, taken with other 
facts, 'raises a natural inference through human experience' of 
causal contribution. 
(Emphasis added.) 
This case is the "type of case" in which Mr. Thompson's 
exposure to known irritants in the workplace immediately prior to 
his two seizures (which occurred during work hours, and which have 
never occurred before or after), either alone or together with Mr. 
Thompson's pre-existing brain condition, does "raise a natural 
inference through human experience" of a causal connection between 
his work and his injury. 
While something more than a mere logical relationship between 
the employment and the injury or disease must be shown, Glasrock 
Home Health Care v. Leiva, 578 So.2d 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1991), causation need not be established with absolute certainty. 
See Jackson v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 734 S.W.2d 617, 620 (Tenn. 
1987) : 
15 
. . . [M] edical proof that the injury was caused in the 
course of the employee's work must not be speculative or 
so uncertain regarding the cause of the injury that 
attributing it to the plaintiff's employment would be an 
arbitrary determination or a mere possibility.... If, 
however, equivocal medical evidence combined with other 
evidence supports a finding of causation, such an 
inference may, nevertheless, be drawn by the trial court 
under the case law... 
(Emphasis added.) 
See also Orman v. Williams Sonoma, Inc.f 803 S.W.2d 672, 676-77 
(Tenn. 1991): 
It is entirely appropriate for a trial judge to predicate 
an award on medical testimony to the effect that a given 
incident 'could be' the cause of the plaintiff's injury, 
when he also has before him lay testimony from which it 
may reasonably be inferred that the incident was in fact 
the cause of the injury. 
Viewing the medical proof ['It seems reasonable that 
the physicians having greater contact with the Plaintiff 
would have the advantage and opportunity to provide a 
more in-depth opinion, if not a more accurate one.'] in 
combination with the lay testimony ['of the employee and 
her husband'], we are persuaded that there exists a 
rational connection between the plaintiff's physical 
condition and the incident that occurred on September 27, 
1985, at the employer's warehouse. We find that the 
injury arose out of and occurred in the course and scope 
of the plaintiff's employment. We reiterate the rule 
that causation need not be established with utmost 
certainty. 
(Emphasis added.) 
See also Florida Power Corporation v. Stenholm, 577 So.2d 977, 982-
83 (Fla. App. 1st Dist. 1991): 
[E]vidence of causation must be shown by something more 
than it is merely logical that the injury arose out of 
the claimant's employment, [t]his is not to say that 
causal relationship requires absolute proof to the 
exclusion of reasonable inferences. 
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• * • 
[I]n Meehan v. Crowder, the Supreme Court rejected the 
employer/carrier's contention that causation in that case was 
based on conjecture, noting that: ' [c]onjecture may be said 
to be supposition without a premise of fact.' [I]n Meehan, 
the Supreme Court found that the compensation award rested 
upon an inference of liability which was sustained by the 
premise of facts to be found, i.e., that the claimant was well 
immediately preceding the [exposure] and was sick soon after. 
The court concluded that ' [t]he evidence show[ed] a natural 
sequence of events based on facts from which liability can be 
inferred.' Id. 
Similarly, in Lake v. Irwin Yacht and Marine, the 
claimant's condition of bronchitis was found to be 
compensable even though the medical test did not 
establish the cause of the bronchitis. Rather, causal 
connection between [the bronchitis] and the employment 
was found to be shown by the medical testimony to the 
effect that the claimant's chemical exposure was the most 
likely cause of the bronchitis based on the claimant's 
history and the fact that she completely recovered after 
permanently leaving the employ of Irwin Yacht. 
[T]his court in Wiley held that the reasonable inference 
of liability therein was supported by the premise of 
facts to be found, i.e., that the claimant was free of 
pulmonary difficulties prior to her exposure.... 
Additionally, her condition improved when she worked for 
other employers and worsened after she returned to the 
[former employer's] work environment. Thus, the claimant 
was exposed to a product which was capable of producing 
the type of illness which she subsequently developed and 
the record indicated the existence of 'a natural sequence 
of events based on facts from which liability can be 
inferred.' 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case, the evidence showed a natural sequence of 
events based on facts from which liability should have been 
inferred. The ALJ should have let the natural and reasonable 
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inferences from the basic facts lead him to a more correct 
decision. 
The case of Peck v. Procter & Gamble, 586 So.2d 714, 717 (La. 
App. 1991), is similar to the instant case in several respects. In 
Peek, the plaintiff/employee had several nonwork factors present 
(such as smoking) . He also worked in a setting where he had direct 
contact with detergents on a daily basis and, at various times 
during his employment, he was exposed to enzymes used in making 
some of the detergents. The plaintiff developed respiratory 
problems and even on one occasion fainted. Plaintiff's physician 
initially opined that plaintiff had restrictive pulmonary disease 
which could well be related to his long standing history of dust 
exposure. After further examination, plaintiff's physician then 
attributed the pulmonary problems to the fact that he was a chronic 
smoker. The Defendant's physician evaluated the worker's medical 
history, examined the worker once and opined that the worker's 
respiratory problems were most probably caused by his being 
overweight and his chronic smoking habit. Another physician, at 
defendant's request, also evaluated the worker's medical history 
and he too related the worker's condition to his smoking. 
The trial court found that the plaintiff had proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there was a causal relationship 
between his employment and the condition. 
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The defendant attacked the trial court's decision on grounds 
of inadequate proof of causation, but the appellate court affirmed: 
The trial court was clearly impressed with plaintiff's 
testimony regarding the nature of his condition and with 
the testimony indicating that plaintiff's health improved 
when he was no longer around the enzyme dust. 
[T] he plaintiff does not have to prove causal connection 
to an absolute certainty. It is sufficient that 
plaintiff establish the cause of his disability by a 
reasonable probability. 
Given this standard of probability, not certainty, the Appellate 
Court ruled that the totality of the evidence, both lay and 
medical, provided a reasonable factual basis for its findings. 
Thus, in looking at the issue of causation, it is entirely 
appropriate to consider, in addition to expert medical testimony 
(invariably from both sides), any factual circumstances which bear 
on the question of causation, such as the presence or absence of 
nonwork-related components (which may or may not have contributed 
to the development of the affliction) , the nature and extent of the 
employee's exposure while employed during work hours or at the 
workplace and the correlations between the claimant's work history 
and the development of the affliction, such as whether he had the 
problem prior to his entry into the workplace and whether the 
problem continued after he left the workplace. 
It is entirely appropriate to draw any and all "natural" or 
"reasonable" inferences from the facts. See Gay v. J. P. Stevens 
Co., 339 S.E.2d 490 (N.C. App. 1986). 
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C. Application to this Case and Discussion 
In this case, the ALJ adopted an artificially high and too 
rigid view of causation. 
Because of that, he did not attempt to consider the reasonable 
inferences which could be drawn from the undisputed facts and 
instead got tangled up in what the IME physician and medical panel 
assumed didn't happen (no respiratory distress) instead of 
concentrating on what did happen. The ALJ concluded medical 
causation was "lacking" but the ALJ did not give sufficient 
consideration to the basic facts of when and where the seizures 
occurred and when and where they did not occur, and did not allow 
himself to consider the natural and reasonable inferences which 
could be drawn from those basic facts. 
Had the ALJ come to the case with the less rigid, more 
flexible standard of causation which should be applied in non-
traumatic injury cases, he would have drawn those natural and 
reasonable inferences and found that the facts supported a 
conclusion consistent with recovery. 
In this case, this issue of cause is a mystery, and it is 
normal to look for clues to solve the mystery. There are, without 
question, a number of factors which exist in the case - no sense of 
smell, the boxing incident, the slight concussion in 1988, the 
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localized EEG abnormality. But what about the causative factors in 
the workplace? 
All of the above listed nonwork-related factors were in 
existence as of 1988 and 1989. Yet at no time, under any 
circumstances, until the summer of 1993, did Mr. Thompson suffer a 
seizure, and he has not suffered any seizure since leaving the 
workplace. And he suffered not one but two seizures, in relatively 
short order, both during work hours, both immediately or soon after 
cleaning the animal kennels with a degreaser and a Chlorox spray. 
Mr. Thompson's employment did involve exposure to Chlorox and 
other chemicals. 
Chlorox (chlorine) is a known irritant and dangerous chemical. 
See, for example, Pittsburgh Bd of Education v. Worker's Comp. 
Appeal Bd, 529 A.2d 1166 (Pa. 1987). 
In this case, there is no dispute that Ivan Thompson's 
seizures occurred during work hours and soon after he had been 
exposed to chemicals with known toxic characteristics in the form 
of an aerosol spray used by him. 
This gets him started. See Larson's Law of Workmen's 
Compensation Law, §38.83(m): 
[T]here is something about the occurrence of an injury 
within the time and space boundaries of employment that 
gives a substantial head start towards compensability. 
On both occasions, when Mr. Thompson did suffer the seizures, it 
was during work hours, immediately following his work duty of 
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cleaning the portable kennels, spraying them with the Chlorox 
solution and exposure to other animal cleaning and treating 
chemicals in the workplace. 
Mr. Thompson's seizures never occurred in any previous 
workplace or at home or at night or on weekends--they occurred 
during the day, while he was working for Davis County Animal 
Control and where he had been using a Chlorox spray and been around 
other chemicals and just after he left the workplace. The seizures 
happened not once, but twice, in virtually the same sequence and 
pattern. 
Mr. Thompson's treating physicians, first his family doctor, 
Dr. Peterson, and then his treating specialist, Dr. Hallquist, 
believed that Mr. Thompson's exposure to the chlorine agent was the 
most likely cause of the seizures. [R180] 
The seizures have not occurred since July 8, 1993. 
Admittedly, Mr. Thompson did not return to the workplace after July 
8, 1993, and under doctor's orders has carefully avoided exposure 
to Chlorox, and he has been taking antiseizure medication, etc.--
but the fact is, he has been seizure-free since being away from the 
workplace. 
Interestingly, the IME doctor, Dr. Matsuo, was totally 
uncertain as to causation and the medical panel virtually admitted 
it was really just guessing as to reasonable proababilities. Yet 
both agreed that Mr. Thompson should keep himself away from 
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chemical fumes. Why should he do that if exposure to such fumes 
was not a likely causative factor? 
In this case, the ALJ ignored these natural and reasonable 
inferences and instead emphasized what presumably didn't happen 
during the seizures. For example, the ALJ placed some emphasis on 
the IME and medical panel's "finding" that Mr. Thompson experienced 
no acute breathing problems prior to the seizures. Whether Mr. 
Thompson experienced respiratory problems prior to the seizures is 
a total unknown - (the IME and the medical panel assume he did not 
but this is entirely an assumption) . But the point is this 
isolated factor should not be given the critical "weight" the ALJ 
gave this particular "clue." Likewise, whether what happened to 
Mr. Thompson happened to anybody else (whether coworkers had 
seizures) is also not dispositive. A seizure is an extremely 
idiosyncratic event. See Herrera v. Fluor Utah, Inc., 550 P. 2d 
144, 146. 
In this case, questions still exist as to causation. They may 
always exist. To determine with greater finality the cause of 
these strange injuries would require Mr. Thompson to subject 
himself to dangerous testing. See Herrera v. Flour Utah, Inc., 550 
P.2d 144 (N.M. App. 1976) at 147: 
There was, of course, one way to conclusively determine 
the cause of the plaintiff's allergy--to expose him to 
more of the same paint. [The doctors] agreed that the 
serious dangers to the plaintiff which could result from 
such a test were not justified by the benefits of knowing 
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with absolute certainty the cause of the plaintiff's 
reactions. The law should not require measures which the 
medical experts decline to take for fear of endangering 
an individual's health. 
(Emphasis added.) 
The ALJ faced a difficult call in this case because the 
central issue of causation involves guesswork, but he should have 
made reasonable inferences from the fundamental facts as to the 
similar space and time characteristics of the seizures and the 
strikingly similar etiology of both seizures. He should have 
required less than absolute certainty in medical causation. 
Had he done so, he would and should have concluded that 
factors related to the workplace were the predominant causative 
factor. He could and should have found a rational connection 
between the workplace and the seizures. He should have come down 
on the side of allowing benefits rather than denying them. See, 
generally, Andreason v. Industrial Comm., 98 Utah 551, 558-59, 100 
P.2d 202 (Utah 1940): 
• * * 
There must be a causal connection between his 
employment, his place of employment, and his illness--
something which happened to him in the performance of his 
duties, or some contact he made at his place of 
employment while on duty there--which forms the 
connecting link between his employment and the 
contraction of the illness. 
• • • 
But in the present case, the contact with possible 
carriers [of bacillus enteritidis] is all within the 
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employment. The disease is uncommon and rare, it is 
contracted from contact with diseased animals 
Anderson had such contact at the company plant. It 
appears affirmatively that he did not have such a contact 
at any other place. . . . [VI] e believe there is only one 
reasonable inference to be drawn: He contracted the 
disease in the course of his employment. 
(Emphasis added) 
The totality of the evidence supports a finding that the 
connection between the workplace and the seizures is much more than 
coincidental. The facts support the "natural and reasonable 
inference" in human experience that the work factors were the 
predominant or triggering cause of the seizures. 
Issue #2. The ALJ committed error in failing to deal 
with the predisposition/aggravation of a pre-existing 
condition argument. 
Did a unique combination of circumstances come together in 
such a way as to make Mr. Thompson more susceptible to a seizure 
and the exposure to chemicals in the workplace push him over the 
edge? Did nonwork-related factors "prime the pump" so that Mr. 
Thompson's work in the workplace with the chemicals was just enough 
to cause him a seizure? See Giles v. Industrial Comm. , 692 P. 2d 
743 (Utah 1984) . 
The ALJ failed to consider this natural and reasonable 
inference. Such was an abuse of discretion 
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A. The ALJ Decision and Board Affirmance 
The ALJ, the IME, and especially the medical panel all 
approached the case in an either/or, all or nothing, manner--the 
cause of the seizures was either the previous head trauma or it was 
the exposure to Chlorox, but not both. 
In his Motion for Review, Mr. Thompson argued that the ALJ 
decision failed to address Mr. Thompson's assertion that exposure 
to disinfecting agents at work may very well have combined with his 
pre-existing sensitivity to chemicals, thereby resulting in a 
compensable industrial injury. In its decision, the Industrial 
Commission, again without any analysis, decided that "While a 
combination of non-industrial causes can, under some circumstances, 
combine to produce a compensable injury, it is necessary for the 
applicant to establish such circumstances by a preponderance of the 
evidence. Mr. Thompson has failed to do so in this case." [R94] 
This was an incorrect conclusion. Mr. Thompson did establish 
such circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. He 
established all of his past brain trauma. He established all of 
the space and time characteristics of the Seizures. The ALJ, the 
IME and the medical panel did not analyze the possibility of the 
two general possible causes acting together, that is, of the idea 
that Mr. Thompson's lack of a sense of smell and his history of a 
few past instances of head trauma may have predisposed him to 
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seizures and that exposure to chemicals in the workplace could have 
pushed him "over the edge." 
B. Operative Statute, Regulation and Case Law 
The law, however, is clear that if a workman, in the course of 
his work, accidentally sustains an injury, the injury is 
compensable even though such injury would not have occurred had not 
the employee been predisposed to such an injury through some pre-
existing physical defect or condition. A claimant with a pre-
existing condition must, of course, prove a later injury is 
"medically" the result of an exertion or exposure that occurred 
during a work-related activity and not solely the result of a pre-
existing condition. 
In other words, a claimant with a pre-existing condition must 
show that the employment contributed something substantial to 
increase the risk he already faced in everyday life because of his 
condition. Thus, situations that accelerate, aggravate or "light 
up" pre-existing conditions and contribute to the subsequent onset 
of symptoms of an injury or disease are compensable. 
In cases involving exposure to chemical agents courts have 
been willing to view such exposure as a triggering cause to lower 
a person's dysfunction threshold already lowered by other factors. 
Admittedly, these cases have analyzed the problem in the context of 
occupational diseases. 
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In Cain v. Guvton, 340 S.E.2d 501, 504-505 (N.C. App. 1986), 
the plaintiff suffered from pre-existing chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease attributable to his smoking cigarettes, his prior 
work for a prior employer in a setting which exposed him to cotton 
dust, and his employment in a furniture factory where he was 
exposed to dangerous fumes. The plaintiff then worked for a new 
employer as a "battery buster." He then developed a serious lung 
disease. Faced with the question of whether his work as a battery 
buster aggravated his lung disease, the court held that an exposure 
which proximately augmented the disease to any extent, however 
slight, would qualify as a significant causal factor in the 
development of the disease and entitle the plaintiff to 
compensation. The administrative agency had held: 
[B]ecause plaintiff's lungs were hyperactive and already 
affected by cotton dust exposure, wood dust exposure, and 
furniture glue fumes exposure, it is more likely that the 
sulfuric acid fumes from the battery busting aggravated 
and accelerated the lung disease . . . 
The employer appealed, arguing insufficient proof of causation. 
The reviewing court affirmed: 
The doctor's testimony that the acid fumes are a 
respiratory irritant, along with testimony that plaintiff 
often inhaled those fumes, is sufficient to establish a 
causal relationship with plaintiff's obstructive lung 
disease. 
Likewise, in Carawan v. Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co., 340 S.E.2d 
506, 508-10 (N.C. App. 1986), the plaintiff had a peculiar 
susceptibility to an insecticide which the employer regularly 
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sprayed in its building as part of routine building maintenance. 
The employee eventually developed allergic contact dermatitis. The 
employer asserted that the conditions and causes which led to 
plaintiff's disability were not peculiar to a particular trade, 
occupation or employment because the insecticide was used by the 
plaintiff in her home and by the supermarket where she shopped. 
(Plaintiff did not experience the same reaction at home or at the 
supermarket where she shopped.) 
The court disagreed and held that issue of whether a worker 
has a greater exposure to a substance on the job than does the 
public generally should be analyzed by whether it is because of the 
nature of the substance itself and whether the concentrations of 
the substance in the workplace may be greater than concentrations 
to which the public generally is exposed. Accordingly, the court 
found the evidence revealed that plaintiff was exposed to a greater 
concentration of the chemical than the general public because of 
the frequency of exposure, the amount of exposure, and the constant 
close physical proximity to the sprayed area: 
The evidence permitted the Commission to find and 
conclude that the form and quantity of her exposure to 
chlorpyrifos caused her to contract a compensable 
occupational disease. 
The court also noted that a condition peculiar to the workplace 
which accelerates the progress of an occupational disease to such 
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an extent that the disease finally causes the worker's incapacity 
should be compensable. 
See also Robinson v. Saif, 717 P.2d 1202, 1205-06 (Or. App. 
1986) , where plaintiff had been exposed outside of work to 
formaldehyde, phenol and hydrocarbons, and then began to work in a 
furniture store where new furniture (which gives off such fumes) 
was uncrated every week. The employee began to experience 
headaches, dizziness and fatigue: 
The difficulty in this case is that claimant has 
become sensitized to chemicals that are present 
throughout the environment . . . In this case, we must 
analyze the degree or quantum of exposure to the 
offending chemicals on and off the job to determine 
compensability. When viewed as a cause of her 
sensitivity, we find the claimant's exposure off the job 
was not substantially the same as her exposure on the job 
the evidence supports the finding that the 
concentrations were significantly higher on the job. 
. . . She experienced symptoms when working in the 
showroom but found relief when working in the well-
ventilated warehouse or resting at home. These factors 
support the conclusion that work was the major 
contributing cause of the disease. 
This case presents conflicting medical evidence from 
three doctors who specialize in allergies. . . . In the 
absence of countervailing considerations, we accord more 
weight to the opinions of the treating physicians. . . . 
[A] claimant must prove that the conditions at work 
were the major contributing cause of the disability. 
. . . Although the specific chemical cause of claimant's 
sensitivity is not conclusively established, she has 
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the major 
contributing cause was her work environment at Struthers, 
which exposed her to concentrations of chemicals much 
greater than she was ordinarily exposed to outside the 
course of employment. (Emphasis added) 
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See also Jarrett v. Industrial Commission of Illinois, 511 
N.E.2d 144, 153-56 (111. App. 1987) in which an employee worked 
with large blocks containing phenothiazine (used by the 
agricultural industry to destroy worms). After several months of 
exposure, he developed dizziness, headaches and then experienced a 
seizure. The evidence was that he had never experienced any of the 
symptoms before, and had no history of seizure disorders. 
The Commission found that claimant's condition of 
ill-being was causally related to his exposure to the 
hazards of an occupational disease; . . . 
On April 8, 1986, on administrative review, the 
trial court found that the Commission's decision was 
against the manifest weight of the evidence because 
claimant 'clearly failed to show any causal connection 
between the alleged seizure activity and exposure to 
phenothiazine while in the employ' of Staley. 
On appeal, claimant contends that the trial court 
erred in reversing the decision of the Commission because 
it was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 
. . . A disease is deemed to have arisen out of the 
employment if it is apparent to the rational mind, upon 
consideration of all the circumstances, that a causal 
connection exists between the conditions under which the 
work is performed and the occupational disease. 
Claimant's seizure disorder is an occupational disease 
under the Act if his exposure to phenothiazine creates a 
risk of contracting the disease which is greater than the 
risk to the general public. . . . 
The court upheld the Commission's finding that a causal 
connection existed between claimant's work condition and his 
seizure. 
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See Judge Learned Hand's opinion in Grain Handling Co. v. 
Sweeney, 102 F.2d 464 (2nd Cir. 1939): (discussing the issue in 
the context of an occupational disease): 
I can see no reason for limiting the protected class to 
those who have a normal resistance to such diseases, or 
for excluding those who are abnormally vulnerable. 
See, generally, Tintic Milliner Co. v. Industrial Comm., 60 
Utah 14, 206 P.278 (Utah 1922) (inhalation of gas in the 
workplace) ; Willardson v. Industrial Commission, 216 Utah Adv. Rep. 
12 (Utah App. 1993). 
C. Application to this Case and Discussion 
In this case, the ALJ, the IME and the medical panel did not 
really consider the possible combination of factors working 
together. Each looked at the problem as being one factor or the 
other factor, not both interacting. The ALJ, looking at it in an 
all-or-nothing fashion, missed the big picture. 
The ALJ's Order clearly reflects that the ALJ never really 
considered the question of whether various factors, coming together 
or acting together, served as a trigger to induce the seizures. 
That, however, is probably the most logical scenario. See Dr. 
Peterson's letter of September 3, 1993, to the Worker's 
Compensation Fund of Utah: 
In his initial episode he presented confused, 
soaking wet with recent amnesia and without trauma. It 
was inferred from this that he probably had had a seizure 
but that it had been possibly provoked by chasing animals 
through a recently sprayed field or some other kind of 
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exposure. As far as irritants that may have contributed 
to that first episode, Dr. Halquist, the neurology 
specialist who has consulted on the case, felt that 
chlorine from using Chlorox in the standard way for 
cleansing the cages that he uses in his truck, etc., 
could make a significant contribution towards setting off 
an irritable focus. 
The second episode was also on a day where he had 
been using chlorine extensively and, again, it is felt to 
be a contributing factor. 
The patient had had at least one concussion prior to 
his employment with D.C.A.C. and had one during an 
encounter with a young bull when he was knocked flat and 
hospitalized with multiple contusions. Dr. Halquist felt 
that these probably were significant in establishing a 
scarred or irritated focus later exacerable by 
environmental exposure, fatigue, etc. 
Hence, my hindsight would lend credence to the 
scenario that Ivan's confirmed seizure disorder is 
triggered into action by some of the chemical used in his 
employment along with other usual trigger factors such as 
fatigue, hunger, etc. 
In the instant case, upon consideration of all the 
circumstances, it "should be apparent to the rational mind" that a 
causal connection exists between the activities or exposures 
required in the workplace and the seizures. Mr. Thompson suffered 
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seizures during the workday soon after being exposed to the 
workplace chemicals. He had never suffered seizures before. He 
has not suffered them since. 
It is a well-settled principle of Utah worker's compensation 
case law that if there is any doubt respecting right to 
compensation (and in this case there will always be doubt), such 
doubt should be resolved in favor of the injured worker and 
recovery, not against the injured worker and against recovery. M&K 
Corp. v. Industrial Comm. , 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948) . 
Issue #3 . The ALJ committed error in denying all worker's 
compensation benefits. 
A. The ALJ Decision and the Board Affirmance 
As mentioned before, both Mr. Thompson's family doctor, Dr. 
Peterson, and then the specialist who treated him, Dr. Hallquist, 
both strongly suspected that his work activities, especially the 
exposure to the chlorine diluted spray, had caused the seizures. 
[R180] 
The treating doctors acted on that basis and provided Mr. 
Thompson with the medical care for which Mr. Thompson is seeking 
compensation. 
The medical panel, who were asked the question of whether the 
medical treatment was reasonable and justified, concluded that 
"because of the circumstances in which the seizures occurred" (that 
is, during work hours and immediately after performing the function 
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of cleaning the kennel with the Chlorox spray and not at any other 
time or after doing anything else) that the medical care was 
reasonable and that "the medical care was justified." [R44-45] 
Yet the ALJ denied all worker's compensation benefits. [R70) 
In his Motion for Review, Mr. Thompson argued the ALJ erred in 
denying all workers' compensation benefits. [R73-95] In its 
decision, the Commission responded: "In effect, Mr. Thompson 
suggests that the ALJ should have awarded medical expenses to Mr. 
Thompson, despite the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Thompson did not 
suffer a compensable injury. The Commission finds no merit to this 
contention. Medical benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act 
are limited to payment for medical expenses necessary to care for 
an industrial injury. Here, there was no industrial injury." 
[R94] 
B. Operative Statute, Regulation and Case Law 
The Commission has the right and the power to make decisions 
in disputed cases which would be in the interest of justice. 
See generally Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Industrial Commission, 
597 P.2d 875 (Utah 1979). 
C. Application to this Case and Discussion 
If, as in this case, the treating physicians, the IME and the 
medical panel concluded it was entirely necessary and reasonable to 
provide an injured employee with medical care (indeed, DeAnn Hess, 
Mr. Thompson's supervisor, ordered the ambulance after the second 
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seizure, without obtaining Mr. Thompson's approval) and that Mr. 
Thompson should continue to avoid contact with chemicals such as 
Chlorox, and if the ALJ adopted the medical panel's findings, the 
Commission should at least have considered ordering the carrier to 
pay medical expenses even though it could have decided not to 
require Mr. Thompson be paid any other compensation under Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-45. 
In other words, in light of the treating physicians' diagnoses 
and treatment (and consequential medical expenses), and the medical 
panel's conclusions, it would have been in the interest of justice 
for the Commission to order the insurance carrier to pay such sums 
as were necessary to treat the patient and the Commission's failure 
to do so is an abdictation of the role as regulator of the Utah 
workplace. 
CONCLUSION CONTAINING A STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Mr. Thompson's testimony as to the facts of exposure to 
chemicals in the workplace, his testimony as to the time and space 
characteristics of the seizures, and the remarkable similarity in 
the pattern of both seizures, along with the opinions of his 
treating physicians, Dr. Peterson and Dr. Hallquist, is more than 
sufficient to support a natural, reasonable, inference that there 
is a rational connection between the workplace and the seizures, at 
least to the extent of supporting payment of his medical expenses. 
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The weight of medical evidence was consistent with recovery. 
The ALJ should have so decided and his failure to do was an 
abuse of discretion. The Commission's affirmance was likewise an 
abuse of discretion. The ALJ was influenced to an extraordinary 
and improper degree by two issues raised by the IME & medical 
panel. 
(1) The previous instances of relatively minor head trauma 
suffered by Mr. Thompson. 
It is not disputed that years earlier Mr. Thompson had had a 
slight concussion, and that several years before he hit his head on 
a truck door . But those experiences never resulted in seizures. 
Why would they, suddenly, several years later, cause two seizures, 
only a few weeks apart, in June & July, 1993, during work hours and 
immediately after performing the same work duties? Is it not a 
natural or reasonable inference that those previous instances of 
head trauma were not a cause or, if a cause, only a remote cause of 
the seizures? That is what his treating physicians concluded. 
[R131, R137, R153, R154, R164, R180] The ALJ and the Commission 
should have reached the same conclusion. 
(2) That Mr. Thompson experienced no respiratory distress, or 
other normal indicia of acute exposure, immediately prior to the 
seizures. [R47] 
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It is not disputed that Mr. Thompson has no sense of smell. 
There is little support in the record either for or against the 
proposition that he did not experience any of the normal indicia of 
acute chlorine exposure. Mr. Thompson doesn't know what happened 
seconds before the seizures. Nobody will ever know. The ALJ and 
the Commission should have given weight to Mr. Thompson's 
testimony, the treating physicians opinions, and the fundamental 
similarity between the work conditions preceding the seizures. 
Instead, the ALJ and the Commission based a conclusion on an 
assumption that Mr. Thompson, who has no sense of smell, did not 
experience respiratory difficulties. Yet this assumption is 
without any support one way or the other. The ALJ and the 
Commission thereby failed to exercise its discretion with respect 
to Mr. Thompson and his predicament in a manner consistent with its 
obligation. 
Had the ALJ not made the errors he made in analyzing the 
question of causation, he and the Commission would have reached a 
much different conclusion. 
The Court should resolve the doubts in this case in favor of 
compensat ion. 
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Dated this ^ / ^ d a y of May, 1995 
ROMNEY 8c CONDIE 
ivid J. HeldsworthN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
ADDENDUM 
(1) Dr. Peterson's summary statement and conclusion to 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(2) Dr. Hallquist's summary statement and conclusion to 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah. 
(3) The Agency Decision sought to be reviewed. 
(4) The Decision of the Board of Review. 
(5) Determinative sections from Workers Compensation 
Statute. 
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This is to certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing PETITIONER'S BRIEF ON APPEAL was placed in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, in Salt Lake City, Utah, this 'Z*/^-
day of May, 1995, addressed to the following: 
Alan Hennebold, General Counsel 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
P.O. Box 146615 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615 
Ivan Thompson 
857 West 1700 North 
West Bountiful, Utah 84087 
Erie V. Boorman 
(^ cojffS ) 
Employer's Reinsurance Fund /-? % A 
P. O. Box 146611 (Z~C^>««J) 
Salt Lake, City, UT 84114 
Mark Dean 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
392 East 6400 South 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, UT 84157-0929 
(2- <-^ v>«W) 
d]h3733 
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FAMILY PHYSICIANS \SSOC. P.C. 
Dennis rf. Peterson, M.D., D.A.B.LP. 
415 SOUTH MEDICAL DRIVE 
S e p t e m b e r 3 , 1 9 9 3 BOUNTIFUL, UTAH WOIO 
Telcnhone 292-7251 
Workers Compensation Fund of Utah 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157 
Re: Mr. Ivan Thompson 
Davis County Animal Control 
Gentlemen, 
Mr. Thompson has called me and asked me to bring you up to date on 
the development of his situation. 
In his initial episode he presented confused, soaking wet with 
recent amnesia and without trauma. It was inferred from this that 
he probably had had a seizure but that it had been possibly 
provoked by chasing animals through a recently sprayed field or 
some other kind of exposure. As far as irritants that may have 
contributed to that first episode, Dr. Holquist, the neurology 
specialist who has consulted on the case, felt that chlorine from 
using Chlorox in the standard way for cleansing the cages that he 
uses in his truck, etc., could make a significant contribution 
towards setting off an irritable focus. 
The second episode was also on a day where he had been using 
chlorine extensively and, again, it is felt to be a contributing 
factor. 
The patient had had at least one concussion prior to his employment 
with D.C.A.C. and had one during an encounter with a young bull 
when he was knocked flat and hospitalized with multiple contusions. 
Dr. Holquist felt that these probably were significant in 
establishing a scarred or irritated focus later exacerable by 
environmental exposure, fatigue, etc. 
Hence, my hindsight would lend credence to the scenario that Ivan's 
confirmed seizure disorder is triggered into action by some of the 
chemical used in his employments along with other usual trigger 
factors such as fatigue, hunger, etc. 
We have explained to him that he cannot drive and is not going to 
be able to perform any of the major components of his previous 
position for at least several months and have recommended that he 
be retrained for other kinds of positions. I will be happy to 
answer any questions you may have. 
Sincer^Tyl ^. 
Dennis R. Peterson, M.D. 
Roberta R. Hallquist, MJ>«, ?X« 
Board Certified In Adult Neurology 
September 17, 1993 
Mr* Rod Peterson, Adjuster 
392 East 6400 South 
P.O. Box 57929 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84157-0929 
Re: Ivan D, Thompson 
Dear Mr. Peterson: 
Mr. Ivan Thompson has been under my neurologic care since July 8, 
1993. He suffered two generalized tonic-clonic seizures, post-
traumatic variety, related to a remote concussion from a boxing 
injury in his teens, and an indirect head trauma due to being 
jarred or charged by a bull a year ago at work, plus occupational 
exposure to chlorine, and other chemical exposure on the work 
place. He has been maintained on anticonvulsant therapy with 
Dilantin, and has had an abnormal EEG. The patient has not been 
released for his usual work or light duty. His condition may be 
permanent, but if he should remain seizure free for one two years 
on anticonvulsant therapy and has a normal sleep deprived EEG, 
there is a chance that he could come off anticonvulsant therapy, 
although this would still give him as much as a ten percent 
probability that his seizures might recur off anticonvulsant 
therapy despite a normal sleep deprived EEG at two years seizure-
free. 
I think it is never going to be in his best interest to be 
working in an environment where he is exposed to toxic chemicals. 
In addition to this, he has had to undergo an otolaryngologic 
evaluation for a possible neoplasm in his right frontal sinus 
that requires surgical exploration and removal. He is unable to 
drive and is to avoid heights, heavy or small machinery, tub 
baths, and swimming. 
Sincerely, 
Roberta R. Hallqui 
RRH/ch 
425 Medical Drive • Suite 122 • Bountiful. Utah 84010 • (801)298-2609 O 0 
TuikhJ 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
IVAN D. THOMPSON, 
Applicant, 
vs, 
DAVIS COUNTY and/or WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
and/or EMPLOYERS' REINSURANCE * 
FUND OF UTAH, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Case No. 93-1036 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER 
BEFORE: 
APPEARANCES: 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah on 
February 2, 1994 at 3:00 o'clock p.m. pursuant to 
Order and Notice of the Commission. 
Benjamin A. Sims, Administrative Law Judge. 
The applicant, Ivan B. Thompson, was present and 
represented by David A. Holdsworth, Attorney at 
Law. 
The defendant employer, Davis County, and its 
insurer, the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, 
were represented by Mark Dean, Attorney at Law. 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie V. Boorman, Attorney at Law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: 
This hearing was initially scheduled for December 12, 1993. 
The applicant underwent surgery, and upon his request and the 
concurrence of the Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (WCF), the 
hearing was delayed until February 2, 1994. 
The preliminary findings of fact, and the proposed questions 
for the medical panel were sent to the parties on February 17, 1994 
allowing them 15 days to make objections. The applicant proposed 
some changes to the preliminary findings and instructions to the 
medical panel, and where the requested changes were not 
inconsistent with the facts as determined from the hearing, the 
proposed changes were made. After receipt of the medical films and 
X-rays, the case was referred to the medical panel on March 4, 
1994, and the medical panel report was received by the Commission 
on June 9, 1994. 
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On June 9, 1994, the medical panel report was sent to the 
parties with instructions to reply not later than the close-of-
business on June 24, 1994. Objections were received from the 
applicant by fax on June 24, 1994. No objections were received 
from the defendants. 
The objections from the applicant to the medical panel report 
have been reviewed. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. The applicant, Ivan D. Thompson, at the time of the 
alleged injuries on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993, was employed by 
Davis County Animal Control. 
2. The applicant had the following work and educational 
experiences: From 1981-83 he attended college; from 1983-85 he 
served and completed a mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-day Saints; in 1985 he returned home and thereafter in 1986-
87 he worked for the California Protection Agency; in 1988-89 he 
worked for Beehive Clothing as a preshrink material fabric 
operator; in 199 0 he worked for Sysco Intermountain Foods, and in 
1991 he went to work for Davis County as an animal control officer. 
3. As an animal control officer, the applicant picked up 
animals; answered emergency calls in relation to animals; helped 
return livestock; sold animal licenses, and performed other related 
duties. 
4. In 1982 while attending college the applicant sustained a 
head injury while boxing in a fund-raiser when he was knocked 
"silly," and was hospitalized overnight. He was told by medical 
personnel that he had suffered a concussion. 
5. In 1988 the applicant suffered another concussion when he 
was loading a washing machine into a pickup truck and hit his head 
on the crest of the door. He went to the emergency room on the 
same day. 
6. The applicant has no sense of smell (anosmia). 
7. After working for a short time as an animal control 
officer prior to the alleged injuries related to the instant claim, 
a large animal described as a bull, cow, or calf, depending on 
which witness was testifying, knocked the applicant to the ground. 
He experienced pain in his chest, and he was in the hospital 
overnight. 
8. Among the applicant's duties was the task to pick up 
animals. Depending on the size of the animal, the applicant would 
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place the critter into a kennel which was approximately the 
following dimensions: one foot by one foot by one foot (which was 
called a "cat" kennel) , or three feet by two feet and one half foot 
by two and one half feet (dog kennel) , or a three feet by three 
feet by four feet (large dog kennel) . The applicant would then 
take the portable kennel, and place it in the bed of his pickup 
truck which has a covered shell on the back of a pickup truck, 
9. The applicant would drive his pickup into the garage 
facility which was described as "large enough to house a dump 
truck.11 The applicant would take the portable kennel out of his 
pickup truck, and place it on the floor of the garage. If the 
animal was a dog, the leash used to restrain the animal would be 
dropped into a bucket containing Parvo disinfectant, a disinfectant 
for parvovirus. The last step in the process of handling the 
animal would be for the applicant to spray the portable dog kennel 
with a solution of Clorox and water. The Clorox was mixed to a 
solution containing 30 parts of water to one part of Clorox. The 
applicant described the Clorox as the same as that which can be 
bought at any grocery store. 
10. The clorox spray typically took from 3 0 seconds to one 
minute per kennel and the applicant would have to spray anywhere 
from two to six kennels per day. A typical day included only two 
kennels. 
11. On June 1, 1993, the applicant cleaned his portable 
kennel before going back into the field. He sprayed it with water, 
used a scrub brush, and the Clorox water spray. He got into his 
truck, but does not remember anything after that. The applicant's 
next recollection was when he saw his wife that afternoon. He 
experienced tongue pain at which time he went to his doctor. The 
applicant was "soaking wet from the waist down," and had some green 
vegetation resembling moss on his pants. 
12. At that time the applicant was admitted to the hospital 
and was kept there for three days. Thereafter he returned to work 
on June 22, 1993. 
13. On July 8, 1993, the applicant picked up a dog and then 
cleaned his kennel with the water and clorox. He went home for 
lunch. The applicant next remembered that "the paramedics came 
through the back door." He looked down and saw vomit on the floor. 
He was placed in an ambulance, and was taken to Lakeview Hospital 
in Bountiful. 
14. The Parvicide is an antiviral agent used to kill a virus 
(Parvo) which is exclusive to dogs. 
15. The Clorox solution was mixed by a maintenance worker and 
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was contained in a portable weed sprayer. The kennels would be 
sprayed in the garage, and would be left to air dry. The animal 
control officer would then take a dry kennel, and put it into his 
truck. 
16. The sprayer was marked as to the correct amount of Clorox 
which should be used in preparation of the clorox/water mixture. 
17. The facilities were inspected regularly by the Humane 
Society of Utah to insure that all substances in use would not be 
injurious to animals, in the event the animals stood in the 
liquids. 
18. Other chemicals used by the animal control facilities, 
but not by the other officers or the applicant, was Excidor, a 
degreaser used by maintenance personnel. The degreaser was used to 
remove grease excreted by dogs. Also previously used was Lemon-
feet which was the officers to disinfect kennels prior to the use 
of the clorox solution. 
19. Mr. Thompson was under various stresses during the time 
he was employed as an animal control officer. He had recently sold 
his home; he was residing with in-laws; and, he was trying to re-
finance a home. The employer was also causing pressure on the 
applicant for not producing or performing up to her standards. The 
record indicates that the applicant was having trouble with his 
license sales. 
20. There was no evidence presented that Davis County sprayed 
insect spray or other contaminants around the animal control 
facility within several days prior to the applicant's industrial 
incidents. The evidence shows that mosquito spray was not used 
within the zone in which the applicant would have expected to be 
working. 
21. The Weber County Crime Lab found no trace of any 
poisonous chemicals on the pants that the applicant was wearing at 
the time of admission to the hospital on July 8. This 
investigation was performed in response to an allegation that 
perhaps the applicant had been poisoned by someone who was "out to 
get him" for some unspecified reason. 
22. On June 22, 1993, the applicant was depressed and 
withdrawn. He indicated that he was tired and ready to collapse. 
23. The applicant was terminated on August 13, 1993, from his 
position because the employer thought that he was "dishonest," and 
had embellished many of his problems. 
24. No other employee has ever had any adverse reaction to 
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the chemicals at the facility, 
25. Dr. Roberta Hallquist, a physician at the Lakeview 
Hospital, determined over a period of time that the applicant had 
experienced grand mal seizures as a result of the applicant's 
exposure to the Clorox solution and other chemicals used at his 
employment. Dr. Hallquist prescribed Dilantin for the applicant. 
26. Dr. Fumizuke Matsuo from the University of Utah 
Department of Neurology evaluated the applicant and his medical 
records and radiological study reports, but was not able to review 
the applicant's original films. Dr. Matsuo concluded that "it does 
not appear that Mr. Thompson" had suffered either acute or chronic 
symptoms suggesting a toxic exposure." He was not sure if he had 
any strong reasons to consider neuro-toxicity of sodium 
hypochlorite as an explanation for the applicant's seizures, 
although he indicated that it would appear prudent to manage Mr. 
Thompson's seizure disorder as a condition of unknown etiology. He 
further agreed with Dr. Hallquist's decision to place the applicant 
on an anti-epileptic drug. Dr. Matsuo concluded that reevaluation 
in one year was recommended and that the applicant could come off 
phenytoin if Mr. Thompson remained without recurrent symptoms. 
With regard to the contribution of the Clorox solution (sodium 
hypochlorite) , he did not feel that there was any strong reason to 
consider that solution as a toxic substance. 
27. The medical panel consisted of Dr. Rawlins (toxicologist) 
and Dr. Thomas (neurologist and chair). The panel met on May 17, 
1994, reviewed the file and history, and examined the applicant as 
well as discussed the applicant's problems with the applicant's 
wife. 
28. The panel concluded in terms of reasonable medical 
probability the following: 
a. There is not a medically demonstrable causal 
connection between the applicant's 1 June 1993 and 8 July 1993 
grand mal seizures and his work as an animal control officer in 
Davis County during 1991 through 1993. 
b. The applicant's seizure problem consisted of two 
highly probable grand mal seizures. 
c. The applicant did not have a nonwork-related 
disability which was affected by his Davis County work. 
d. The medical care which the applicant received since 
1 June 1993 was not necessitated by exposure to chemicals while 
working for Davis County during the relevant periods. 
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e. There is no future medical care which can reasonably 
be expected to be necessitated by the applicant's exposure. 
f. The applicant does not appear to have any permanent 
impairment except for the anosmia and the seizure disorder, both of 
which are considered nonindustrial. 
29. The judge adopts the findings of the medical panel as his 
own, 
DISCUSSION: 
Counsel for the applicant has done a commendable job in 
providing a thorough analysis as to why this case should be decided 
in favor of the applicant. However, medical causation is lacking, 
and the weight of the medical opinion is contrary to a finding of 
medical causation. 
The medical panel as well as Dr. Matsuo concluded that it was 
unlikely that the exposure to the Clorox solution was sufficient to 
cause any impact on the applicant's cerebral function. There were 
none of the normal prodromes of significant respiratory distress 
which ordinarily accompany even slight exposure to any Clorox type 
spray. Additionally, there was a significant delay in the 
occurrence of a seizure after the last exposure. During this 
delay, the applicant was apparently able to function well which 
suggested to the medical panel that there was no acute involvement. 
In the absence of major noticeable respiratory distress, it is 
not reasonable for there to be any continuing effects of the Clorox 
type exposure on a cumulative basis. Also, there is no indication 
that exposure to other agents including the detergent and the 
Parvosol could have produced a convulsive seizure. 
There are other clues unrelated to the applicant's work at 
Davis County which predated his employment with Davis County and 
are likely the causative factors. These are noted by the medical 
panel to be: 
a. The likelihood of an injury which ruptured the 
olfactory fibers as they came down through the lamina cribrosa 
beneath the frontal lobes of the brain. The evidence shows that 
the applicant's anosmia predated his work at Davis County. 
b. There is history of an abnormal ventricle consistent 
with an injury back in 1988. A localized EEG abnormality is 
recorded which is not likely the result of a diffuse general toxic 
agent. 
c. The applicant had a concussion in a boxing match 
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while in college sufficient to require emergency room care, and 
sufficient to require him to miss a period of school, 
d. He hit his head on the door frame of his vehicle. 
This was severe enough to cause him to obtain a CT scan at the 
time. 
e. His low blood sugar noted during one of his seizures 
would not have occurred from exposure to the chemicals. 
f. There is long standing evidence of asymmetry of the 
lateral ventricles of the brain. 
g. The suggestion that his anosmia might have allowed 
him to have a greater exposure is negated by his intolerance to 
even minimal exposures to gasoline, paint, or to the Clorox. 
The applicant was exposed to small household and laundry type 
concentrations of Clorox. There was no evidence that any other 
members of the Davis County animal control section ever became ill 
as a result of the exposures. 
Under such circumstances, it has not been shown to a 
preponderance that the seizures were medically caused by the work 
at Davis County, and this case must therefore be dismissed. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
There is insufficient evidence to show that Ivan D. Thompson's 
grand mal seizures which occurred on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993 
arose out of and in the course of exposure to Clorox and other 
chemicals related to his employment for Davis County. 
ORDER: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the claims of Ivan D. Thompson for 
worker's compensation benefits based upon exposure to Clorox and 
other chemicals used while employed by Davis County, allegedly 
resulting in grand mal seizures on June 1, 1993 and July 8, 1993, 
are hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. In the event a Motion for Review is 
timely filed, the opposing parties shall have 15 days from the date 
of filing with the Commission, in which to file a written response 
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with the Commission in accordance with U.CA. Section 63-46b-12(2). 
DATED THIS J day of July 1994. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISST©frp^UTAH 
lamim A. Sims 
Jminisxrative Law Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the #-~) day of July 1994, the 
attached ORDER in the case of Ivan D.""Thompson was mailed, postage 
prepaid to the following persons at the following addresses: 
Ivan Thompson 
595 N 800 W 
W Bountiful UT 84087 
David J. Holdsworth, Atty 
185 S State #500 
Salt Lake City UT 84111 
Mark Dean, Atty 
The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah (Drop Box) 
Erie V. Boorman, Atty 
The Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
IVAN D. THOMPSON 
Applicant, 
vs. 
DAVIS COUNTY and WORKERS 
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH, 
Defendants. 
* 
* 
ORDER DENYING 
MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case Nos. 93-1036 
and 93-1037 
Ivan D. Thompson seeks review of an Administrative Law Judge's 
Order which denied Mr. Thompson's claim for compensation under the 
Utah Workers' Compensation Act. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53, and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's decision. In summary, Mr. Thompson worked as an animal 
control officer for Davis County. His employment required that he 
use various disinfecting agents to clean animal cages. 
On June 1 and again on July 8, 1993, Mr. Thompson experienced 
grand mal seizures while at work. Dr. Hallquist, Mr. Thompson's 
treating physician, attributed such seizures to Mr. Thompson's 
exposure to the disinfecting agents used at his work. Dr. Matsuo, 
from the University of Utah's Neurology Department, concluded that 
Mr. Thompson's seizures were not caused by the disinfecting agents. 
Due to the difference of medical opinion in this matter, the 
ALJ appointed a medical panel which reviewed Mr. Thompson's records 
and examining Mr. Thompson himself. The panel found no causal 
connection between Mr. Thompson's seizures and the disinfecting 
agents used at his work. 
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Based on the medical panel's report, the ALJ concluded Mr. 
Thompson had failed to establish that his work caused his seizures. 
The ALJ therefore denied Mr. Thompson's claim for workers' 
compensation benefits. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Utah Workers' Compensation Act requires payment of 
compensation and medical benefits to workers injured by accident 
arising out of and in the course of employment. It is the 
obligation of the worker claiming such benefits to establish a 
causal connection between work and injury. In this case, the ALJ 
concluded Mr. Thompson had failed to prove a causal relationship 
between his work and his injuries. 
Mr. Thompson's Motion For Review alleges the ALJ required Mr. 
Thompson to prove causation "to a certainty," thereby applying a 
too-stringent standard of proof on Mr. Thompson. However, the 
Commission's review of the ALJ's decision shows that the ALJ 
applied the correct standard of proof, preponderance of the 
evidence, to Mr. Thompson's claim. 
Mr. Thompson also contends the ALJ's decision failed to 
address Mr. Thompson's assertion that exposure to disinfecting 
agents at work may have combined with his preexisting sensitivity 
to chemicals, thereby resulting in a compensable industrial injury. 
While a combination of nonindustrial and industrial causes can, 
under some circumstances, combine to produce a compensable injury, 
it is necessary for the applicant to establish such circumstances 
by a preponderance of the evidence. Mr. Thompson has failed to do 
so in this case. 
Finally, Mr. Thompson alleges the ALJ erred in denying all 
workers' compensation benefits. In effect, Mr. Thompson suggests 
that the ALJ should have awarded medical expenses to Mr. Thompson, 
despite the ALJ's conclusion that Mr. Thompson did not suffer a 
compensable injury. The Commission finds no merit to this 
contention. Medical benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act 
are limited to payment for medical expenses necessary to care for 
an industrial injury. Here, there was no industrial injury. 
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ORDER 
The Commission affirms the decision of the ALJ and dismisses 
Mr. Thompson's Motion For Review. It is so ordered. 
Dated this /^^JU day of November-, JL994 
Stephen' M« 
Chairman 
te//6to/^ 
Thomas R. Carlson 
Commissioner 
/<<? ^ ^g^S^^ ^  iff2 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 2 0 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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CERTIFICATION OF MAILING 
I certify that a copy of the foregoing Order Denying Motion 
For Review in the matter of Ivan D. Thompson, Case No.s 93-1036 and 
93-1037, was mailed, first class, postage prepaid, thisg?->J^day of 
December, 1994, to the following: 
DAVID J. HOLDSWORTH 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
185 SOUTH STATE STREET, SUITE 500 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
ERIE V. BOORMAN 
EMPLOYER'S REINSURANCE FUND 
P O BOX 146611 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
MARK DEAN 
WORKERS COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH 
392 EAST 6400 SOUTH 
P 0 BOX 57929 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84157-0929 
A'dell Butler-Mitchell 
Support Specialist 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
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64-13-19, except as required by federal s tatute or reg-
ulation. 1993 
35-1-44. Definition of terms. 
The following terms as used in this title shall be 
construed as follows: 
(1) "Average weekly earnings" means the av-
erage weekly earnings arrived at by the rules 
provided in Section 35-1-75. 
(2) "Award" means the finding or decision of 
the commission as to the amount of compensation 
due any injured, or the dependents of any de-
ceased, employee. 
(3) "Compensation" means the payments and 
benefits provided for in this title. 
(4) "Disability" means becoming medically im-
paired as to function. Disability can be total or 
partial, temporary or permanent, industrial or 
nonindustrial. 
(5) "General order" means an order applying 
generally throughout the state to all persons, em-
ployments, or places of employment of a class un-
der the jurisdiction of the commission. All other 
orders of the commission shall be considered spe-
cial orders. 
(6) "Impairment" is a purely medical condition 
reflecting any anatomical or functional abnor-
mality or loss. Impairment may be either tempo-
rary or permanent, industrial or nonindustrial. 
(7) "Order" means any decision, rule, regula-
tion, direction, requirement or standard of the 
commission, or any other determination arrived 
at, or decision made, by the commission. 
(8) (a) "Personal injury by accident arising out 
of and in the course of employment" includes 
any injury caused by the willful act of a third 
person directed against an employee because 
of his employment. 
(b) The term does not include a disease, 
except as the disease results from the injury. 
(9) "Safe" and "safety," as applied to any em-
ployment or place of employment, means the 
freedom from danger to the life, health, or wel-
fare of employees reasonably permitted by the 
nature of the employment. 
(10) "Welfare" means comfort, decency, and 
moral well-being. 1991 
35-1-45. Compensation for industrial accidents 
to be paid. 
Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is 
injured and the dependents of each such employee 
who is killed, by accident arising out of and in the 
course of his employment, wherever such injury oc-
curred, if the accident was not purposely self-in-
flicted, shall be paid compensation for loss sustained 
on account of the injury or death, and such amount 
for medical, nurse, and hospital services and medi-
cines, and, in case of death, such amount of funeral 
expenses, as provided in this chapter. The responsi-
bility for compensation and payment of medical, 
nursing, and hospital services and medicines, and fu-
neral expenses provided under this chapter shall be 
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on 
the employee. 1988 
35-1-46. Employers to secure workers* compen-
sation benefits for employees — 
Methods — Failure — Notice — Injunc-
tion — Violation. 
(1) Employers, including counties, cities, towns, 
and school districts, shall secure the payment of 
workers' compensation benefits for their employees: 
(a) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah, which payments 
shall commence within 30 days after any final 
award by the commission; 
(b) by insuring, and keeping insured, the pay-
ment of this compensation with any stock corpo-
ration or mutual association authorized to trans-
act the business of workers' compensation insur-
ance in this state, which payments shall com-
mence within 30 days after any final award by 
the commission; or 
(c) by furnishing annually to the commission 
satisfactory proof of financial ability to pay direct 
compensation in the amount, in the manner, and 
when due as provided for in this title, which pay-
ments shall commence within 30 days after any 
final award by the commission. In these cases the 
commission may in its discretion require the de-
posit of acceptable security, indemnity, or bond to 
secure the payment of compensation liabilities as 
they are incurred, and may at any time change or 
modify its findings of fact herein provided for, if 
in its judgment this action is necessary or desir-
able to secure or assure a strict compliance with 
all the provisions of law relating to the payment 
of compensation and the furnishing of medical, 
nurse, and hospital services, medicines, and bur-
ial expenses to injured employees and to the de-
pendents of killed employees. The commission 
may in proper cases revoke any employer's privi-
lege as a self-insurer. 
(2) The commission is authorized and empowered 
to maintain a suit in any court of the state to enjoin 
any employer, within the provisions of this chapter, 
from further operation of the employer's business, 
where the employer has failed to provide for the pay-
ment of benefits in one of the three ways provided in 
this section. Upon a showing of failure to so provide, 
the court shall enjoin the further operation of the 
employer's business until the payment of these bene-
fits has been secured by the employer as required by 
this section. The court may enjoin the employer with-
out requiring bond from the commission. 
(3) If the commission has reason to believe tha t an 
employer of one or more employees is conducting a 
business without securing the payment of compensa-
tion in one of the three ways provided in this section, 
the commission may give such employer five days' 
written notice by registered mail of such noncompli-
ance and if the employer within said period does not 
remedy such default, the commission may file suit as 
provided in this section and the court is empowered, 
ex parte, to issue without bond a temporary injunc-
tion restraining the further operation of the em-
ployer's business. 1989 
35-1-46.10. Notice of noncompl iance to em-
ployer — Enforcement power of com-
mission — Penalty. 
(1) In addition to the remedies specified in Section 
35-1-46, if the commission has reason to believe that 
an employer of one or more employees is conducting 
business without securing the payment of benefits in 
one of the three ways provided in Section 35-1-46, the 
commission may give that employer written notice of 
the noncompliance by certified mail to the last known 
address of the employer. 
(2) If the employer does not remedy the default 
within 15 days after delivery of this notice, the com-
mission may issue an order requiring the employer to 
appear before the commission and show cause why 
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benefit of all the dependents, as may be determined 
by the commission, which may apportion the benefits 
among the dependents in such manner as it deems 
just and equitable Payment to a dependent subse-
quent in right may be made, if the commission deems 
it proper, and shall operate to discharge all other 
claims therefor The dependents, or persons to whom 
benefits are paid, shall apply the same to the use of 
the several beneficiaries thereof in compliance with 
the finding and direction of the commission In all 
cases of death where the dependents are a surviving 
spouse and one or more minor children, it shall be 
sufficient for the widow or widower to make applica-
tion to the commission on behalf of that individual 
and the minor children, and in cases where all of the 
dependents are minors, the application shall be made 
by the guardian or next friend of such minor depen-
dents The commission may, for the purpose of pro-
tecting the rights and interests of any minor depen-
dents it deems incapable of doing so, provide a 
method of safeguarding any payments due them 
Should any dependent of a deceased employee die 
during the period covered by such weekly payments, 
the right of such dependent to compensation under 
this title shall cease Should a surviving spouse, who 
is a dependent of a deceased employee and who is 
receiving the benefits of this title remarry, that indi-
vidual's sole right after such remarriage, to further 
payments of compensation shall be the right to re-
ceive in a lump sum the balance of the weekly com-
pensation payments unpaid from the time of remar-
riage to the end of six years or 312 weeks from the 
date of the injury from which death resulted, but in 
no event shall such amount exceed 52 weeks of com-
pensation at the weekly compensation rate the sur-
viving spouse was receiving at the time of such re-
marriage If there are other dependents remaining at 
the time of remarriage, benefits payable under this 
title shall be paid to such person as the commission 
may determine, for the use and benefit of the other 
dependents, the weekly benefits to be paid at inter-
vals of not less than four weeks 1977 
35-1-74. Increase of award to children and de-
pendent spouse — Effect of death, 
marriage, majority, or termination of 
dependency of children — Death, di-
vorce, or remarriage of spouse. 
In all cases where an award is made to, or in-
creased because of a dependent spouse or dependent 
minor child or children, as provided in this title, such 
award or increase in amount of the award shall cease 
at the death, marriage, at tainment of the age of eigh-
teen years, or termination of dependency of such 
minor child or children or upon the death, divorce or 
remarriage of the spouse of the employee, subject to 
those provisions relative to the remarriage of a 
spouse as provided in Section 35-1-73 1979 
35-1-75. Average weekly wage — Basis of com-
putation. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this act, the 
average weekly wage of the injured employee at the 
time of the injury shall be taken as the basis upon 
which to compute the weekly compensation rate and 
shall be determined as tollows 
(a) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the year, the average weekly wage shall 
be that yearly wage divided by 52 
(b) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the month, the average weekly wage 
shall be that monthly wage divided by 4 V3 
(c) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the week, that amount shall be the aver-
age weekly wage 
(d) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the day, the weekly wage shall be deter-
mined by multiplying the daily wage by the 
number of days and fraction of days in the week 
during which the employee under a contract of 
hire was working at the time of the accident, or 
would have worked if the accident had not inter-
vened In no case shall the daily wage be multi-
plied by less than three for the purpose of deter-
mining the weekly wage 
(e) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the hour, the average weekly wage shall 
be determined by multiplying the hourly rate by 
the number of hours the employee would have 
worked for the week if the accident had not inter-
vened In no case shall the hourly wage be multi-
plied by less than 20 for the purpose of determin-
ing the weekly wage 
(f) If at the time of the injury the hourly wage 
has not been fixed or cannot be ascertained, the 
wage for the purpose of calculating compensation 
shall be the usual wage for similar services 
where those services are rendered by paid em-
ployees 
(g) (1) If at the time of the injury the wages are 
fixed by the output of the employee, the av-
erage weekly wage shall be the wage most 
favorable to the employee computed by di-
viding by 13 the wages, not including over-
time or premium pay, of the employee 
earned through that employer in the first, 
second, third, or fourth period of 13 consecu-
tive calendar weeks in the 52 weeks immedi-
ately preceding the injury 
(11) If the employee has been employed by 
that employer less than 13 calendar weeks 
immediately preceding the injury, his aver-
age weekly wage shall be computed as under 
Subsection (l)(g)(i), presuming the wages, 
not including overtime or premium pay, to 
be the amount he would have earned had he 
been so employed for the full 13 calendar 
weeks immediately preceding the injury and 
had worked, when work was available to 
other employees, in a similar occupation 
(2) If none of the methods m Subsection (1) will 
fairly determine the average weekly wage in a partic-
ular case, the commission shall use such other 
method as will, based on the facts presented, fairly 
determine the employee's average weekly wage 
(3) When the average weekly wage of the injured 
employee at the time of the injury is determined as in 
this section provided, it shall be taken as the basis 
upon which to compute the weekly compensation 
rate After the weekly compensation has been com-
puted, it shall be rounded to the nearest dollar 1994 
35-1-76. Likelihood of increase to be consid-
ered. 
If it is established that the injured employee was of 
such age and experience when injured that under 
natural conditions his wages would be expected to 
increase, that fact may be considered in arriving at 
his average weekly wage 1953 
35-1-77. Medical panel — Medical director or 
medical consultants — Discretionary 
authority of commission to refer case 
— Findings and reports — Objections 
to report — Hearing — Expenses . 
(1) (a) Upon the filing of a claim for compensation 
for injury by accident, or for death, arising out of 
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and in the course of employment, and if the em-
ployer or its insurance carrier denies liability, 
the commission may refer the medical aspects of 
the case to a medical panel appointed by the com-
mission 
(b) When a claim for compensation based upon 
disability or death due to an occupational disease 
is filed with the commission, the commission 
shall, except upon stipulation of all parties, ap-
point an impartial medical panel 
(c) A medical panel shall consist of one or more 
physicians specializing in the treatment of the 
disease or condition involved in the claim 
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an 
impartial medical evaluation of the medical as-
pects of a controverted case, the commission may 
employ a medical director or medical consultants 
on a full-time or part-time basis for the purpose 
of evaluating the medical evidence and advising 
the commission with respect to its ultimate fact-
finding responsibility If all parties agree to the 
use of a medical director or medical consultants, 
they shall be allowed to function in the same 
manner and under the same procedures as re-
quired of a medical panel 
(2) (a) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall make such study, take 
such X-rays, and perform such tests, including 
post-mortem examinations if authorized by the 
commission, as it may determine to be necessary 
or desirable 
(b) The medical panel, medical director, or 
medical consultants shall make a report in writ-
ing to the commission in a form prescribed by the 
commission, and also make such additional find-
ings as the commission may require In occupa-
tional disease cases, the panel shall certify to the 
commission the extent, if any, of the disability of 
the claimant from performing work for remuner-
ation or profit, and whether the sole cause of the 
disability or death, in the opinion of the panel, 
results from the occupational disease and 
whether any other causes have aggravated, pro-
longed, accelerated, or in any way contributed to 
the disability or death, and if so, the extent in 
percentage to which the other causes have so con-
tributed 
(c) The commission shall promptly distribute 
full copies of the report to the applicant, the em-
ployer, and its insurance carrier by certified mail 
with return receipt requested Within 15 days 
after the report is deposited in the United States 
post office, the applicant, the employer, or its in-
surance carrier may file with the commission 
written objections to the report If no written ob-
jections are filed within that period, the report is 
considered admitted in evidence 
(d) The commission may base its finding and 
decision on the report of the panel, medical direc-
tor, or medical consultants, but is not bound by 
the report if other substantial conflicting evi-
dence in the case supports a contrary finding 
(e) If objections to the report are filed, the com-
mission may set the case for hearing to deter-
mine the facts and issues involved At the hear-
ing, any party so desiring may request the com-
mission to have the chairman of the medical 
panel, the medical director, or the medical con-
sultants present at the hearing for examination 
and cross-examination For good cause shown, 
the commission may order other members of the 
panel, with or without the chairman or the medi-
cal director or medical consultants, to be present 
at the hearing for examination and cross-exami-
nation 
(D The written report of the panel, medical di-
rector, or medical consultants may be received as 
an exhibit at the hearing, but may not be consid-
ered as evidence in the case except as far as it is 
sustained by the testimony admitted 
(g) The expenses of the study and report of the 
medical panel, medical director, or medical con-
sultants and the expenses of their appearance be-
fore the commission shall be paid out of the Em-
ployers' Reinsurance Fund 1994 
35-1-78. Continuing jurisdiction of commission 
to modify award — Authority to de-
stroy records — Interest on award — 
No authority to change statutes of limi-
tation. 
(1) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission 
over each case shall be continuing The commission, 
after notice and hearing, may from time to time mod-
ify or change its former findings and orders Records 
pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive 
for ten years, other than cases of total permanent 
disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as 
in Section 35-1-98, may be destroyed at the discretion 
of the commission 
(2) Awards made by the Industrial Commission 
shall include interest at the rate of 8% per annum 
from the date when each benefit payment would have 
otherwise become due and payable 
(3) (a) This section may not be interpreted as mod-
ifying m any respect the statutes of limitations 
contained in other sections of this chapter or Ti-
tle 35, Chapter 2, Utah Occupational Disease 
Act 
(b) The commission has no power to change 
the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsec-
tion (3)(a) in any respect 1994 
35-1-79. L u m p - s u m p a y m e n t s . 
The commission, under special circumstances and 
when the same is deemed advisable, may commute 
periodical benefits to one or more lump-sum pay-
ments 1953 
35-1-80. Compensation exempt from execution. 
Compensation before payment shall be exempt 
from all claims of creditors, and from at tachment or 
execution, and shall be paid only to employees or 
their dependents 1953 
35-1-81. Awards — Medical, nursing, hospital 
and burial expenses — Artificial 
means and appliances. 
(1) In addition to the compensation provided in this 
chapter the employer or the insurance carrier shall 
pay reasonable sums for medical, nurse, and hospital 
services, for medicines, and for artificial means, ap-
pliances, and prostheses necessary to treat the in-
jured employee 
(2) If death results from the injury, the employer or 
the insurance carrier shall pay the burial expenses in 
ordinary cases as established by rule 
(3) If a compensable accident results in the break-
ing of or loss of an employee's artificial means or ap-
pliance including eyeglasses, the employer or insur-
ance carrier shall provide a replacement of the artifi-
cial means or appliance 
(4) The commission may require the employer or 
insurance carrier to maintain the artificial means or 
appliances or provide the employee with a replace-
